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493 
MAKING SENSE OF EQUALITY 
ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN 
EQUALITY. By Jeremy Waldron.1 Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 2017. Pp. xi + 264. $29.95 
(hardcover). 
Mark D. Rosen2 
Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence’s 
other signatories professed it “self-evident that all men are 
created equal.”3 Renowned Yale historian Edmund Morgan 
used less exalted language, insisting that equality is a “fiction,” 
albeit an important and necessary one.4 Morgan thought it a 
fiction insofar as it would be “difficult, if not impossible, to 
demonstrate the[] proposition[] by factual evidence[,]” and that, 
to the contrary, it “might be somewhat easier, by the kind of 
evidence we usually require for the proof of any debatable 
proposition, to demonstrate that men are not created 
equal . . . .”5 But Morgan thought it “not inappropriate” to call 
equality a self-evident truth because such a designation “implies 
our commitment” to equality and “protects [it] from challenge.”6 
All societies, Morgan suggests, are built on cornerstone 
commitments that are ultimately indemonstrable. “[T]o 
challenge” our commitment to equality, says Morgan, “would 
rend the fabric of our society.”7 
 
 1. University Professor, New York University School of Law. 
 2. University Distinguished Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I 
received extremely helpful comments from Mark Alznauer, Katherine Baker, Alex Boni-
Saenz, Todd Ferguson, Sam Fleischacker, and Steve Heyman. This essay is dedicated to 
my lovely daughter Tila, who to my delight both is, and is not, the equal of her brothers. 
(Mutatis mundi as regards each of her siblings). 
 3. Jefferson wrote the first draft of the Declaration, which declared it “sacred and 
undeniable[]” that “all men are created equal.” See THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
VOL. 1, 1760–1776, at 423 (Julian P. Boyd, ed.). 
 4. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 14 (1988). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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In short, Jefferson treats equality as an unprovable axiom8; 
Morgan suggests doing otherwise would be unwise and 
dangerous. Consistent with Jefferson’s and Morgan’s 
approaches, America’s commitment to equality has not been 
given a foundational justification. 
Until now. In an important new book, One Another’s 
Equals: The Basis of Human Equality, Jeremy Waldron aims to 
philosophically ground this basic American commitment (pp. 66, 
84). While its arguments are illuminating and deeply 
consequential, this Review argues that Waldron’s book 
ultimately does not take equality far beyond a Jeffersonian 
axiom, mostly (though not entirely) owing to the book’s self-
conscious epistemic modesty. The Review also argues that 
Waldron makes more of a case for “sharedness” than for 
“equality,” as it explains why they are conceptually distinct 
notions. These limitations do not undermine the importance of 
Waldron’s book, but they may have implications for what we 
understand Waldron’s project to be. 
The Review also suggests a need to tame some of Waldron’s 
conclusions as to equality’s prescriptive and normative 
implications. Waldron seems to say that equality’s entailments 
are absolute in two senses: that they accrue equally to every 
person, and that they trump all competing moral considerations. 
The Review argues that the book does not adequately make the 
case for either absolutism, and shows that Waldron himself 
resists both absolutisms when considering concrete cases. And 
this is a good thing, because giving strict effect to the two 
absolutisms would problematically destabilize substantial swaths 
of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. 
More generally, the Review argues that accepting the two 
absolutisms would unduly cede contemporary human agency. 
Today’s analysis cannot generate tomorrow’s final answers 
because there is no “end-of-history” for normativity. 
Accordingly, each generation’s recognition of its necessary 
agency in working out equality’s entailments is more sensible 
than an absolutism-induced passivity. But though it should not 
 
 8. This may oversimplify Jefferson’s position, insofar as he likely was aware of the 
arguments for equality that had been propounded by the important enlightenment 
thinkers, in particular Locke and Hobbes. But Waldron is quite right in his observation 
that “not nearly enough work has been done” to provide a philosophical account of 
human equality (p. 15). 
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be treated as the final word on the subject, One Another’s 
Equals can enormously assist the agency-demanding 
undertaking of continuing to work out what should follow from 
our political community’s commitment to equality. Waldron’s 
book can serve an invaluable task, pace Morgan’s implicit advice 
that we not dig too deeply into our cornerstone political 
commitments. 
I. BASIC EQUALITY 
Waldron’s book aims to develop an account of what he calls 
the principle of basic equality, namely the “idea that we humans 
are fundamentally one another’s equals” (p. 10). The book does 
not address what Waldron dubs “surface-level equality,” namely 
the “sort of social or economic equality” for which egalitarians 
have mostly argued; for example, equality of well-being, 
resources, opportunity, or capabilities (pp. 9-10).9 Basic equality 
is conceptually distinct from surface-level equality,10 and has 
received relatively little scholarly attention (p. 10). 
Waldron thinks that basic equality applies to all human 
beings—to Hitler and Mother Theresa, as well as the most 
profoundly disabled and those in the final stages of Alzheimer’s 
disease. He calls this position continuous equality (pp. 30-31). By 
contrast, many past proponents of equality thought certain 
subsets of the human population were not their equal; excluded 
subpopulations have included slaves, blacks, Asians, heathens, 
and women. These past proponents adopted what might be 
called discontinuous equality.11 Waldron also champions the view 
that basic equality applies only to human beings, and not to 
other animals.12 He dubs this distinctive equality (pp. 30-31). In 
short, in embracing continuous and distinctive equality, Waldron 
claims that basic equality extends to all human beings, and only 
to human beings. 
 
 9.  Although Waldron agrees such issues are “by no means superficial” (p. 10), his 
nomenclature of “‘surface-level”’ might be criticized as impliedly giving them short shrift. 
 10.  Waldron thinks Peter Westen’s well known critique of equality applies to 
surface-level equality, but not basic equality (pp. 67-68). Later I suggest otherwise. 
 11. This phrase simplifies Waldron’s. See pp. 26-32 (discussing “Rashdall-
discontinuities”). 
 12.  Waldron does not take up the question of whether basic equality might apply 
to intelligent machines. See generally Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to Explain Itself?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-
taught-to-explain-itself.html?_r=0. 
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According to Waldron, the principle of basic equality “is 
itself prescriptive” (p. 46), meaning that it “call[s] for something 
to be done that might not otherwise be done” (p. 42). Waldron 
believes that basic equality performs very substantial 
prescriptive and normative work,13 including “sustaining human 
dignity” (p. 207), “underpin[ning] the entitlement of each of us 
to justice,” and “ground[ing] the equal basic rights we have” (p. 
142), including free speech, personal liberty, and religion (p. 
249). Basic equality also imposes demands on us in our political 
relations with our fellow citizens. Basic equality “requires that 
we are to be counted equally in any calculation of the general 
good,” and “ground[s] some sense of our equal authority, equal 
respect, leading into democracy as well as the autonomy we are 
entitled to in the living of our lives” (pp. 141-142). This equal 
respect amounts to a “form of deference and accommodation,” 
and includes the “recognition and acknowledgement of someone 
as an intellect with a point of view and opinions of her own . . .” 
(p. 250). And Waldron thinks that basic equality imposes 
obligations that extend beyond fellow members of our political 
community. For example, Waldron thinks basic equality 
absolutely forbids torturing a terrorist to extract information 
that would foil a future attack (pp. 186-187). 
Although One Another’s Equals leaves most of basic 
equality’s concrete implications for constitutional law 
substantially unspecified, basic equality would seem to be 
potentially relevant to a wide range of constitutional issues. At 
one point Waldron suggests that basic equality might imply an 
entitlement to certain economic goods.14 And basic equality’s 
 
 13.  By normative, Waldron means the “generation or use of general norms” (p. 
43). Waldron tells us that his prescriptive claims “usually. . . involve . . . normativity” as 
well (p. 43). 
 14.  See p. 37 (arguing that “[s]urface-level inequalities involving absolute 
deprivation might be denounced on t[he] basis” of the “normative principle” of “basic 
equality,” and “perhaps certain levels of relative deprivation” as well). At one point, the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection fundamental rights jurisprudence seemed amenable to 
treating poverty as a suspect class with the result that government policies that 
differentially affected the poor would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. See 
generally Frank I. Michelman, Foreword, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). And even contemporary doctrine suggests that 
absolute deprivations of certain basic goods might be unconstitutional, at least when 
government makes those goods available to some people. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973) (“The precedents of this Court provide the 
proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class 
discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because 
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entailments of dignity and autonomy seem germane to the 
constitutional analysis of the death penalty, the right-to-die, and 
abortion, as well as the freedoms of speech and religion (pp. 249-
250). 
Waldron’s distinction between an account that can justify 
the principle of basic equality, on the one hand, and normative 
equality’s prescriptive implications, on the other, puts the reader 
on notice as to the burden that One Another’s Equals 
appropriately bears. As Waldron himself notes, the justifications 
for basic equality must be sufficient to sustain the principle’s 
prescriptions (pp. 248-250). In keeping with this, Part II of this 
review focuses on Waldron’s arguments for basic equality, while 
Part III analyzes what Waldron takes to be basic equality’s 
prescriptive implications. The Review identifies some important 
disconnects between One Another’s Equals’ justifications and 
prescriptions. 
II. THE SURPRISINGLY MODEST CASE FOR BASIC 
EQUALITY 
Waldron’s argument for basic equality can be reduced to 
three steps. A bird’s-eye-view will prove useful before 
proceeding to a fine-grained analysis. Step One is that humans 
have certain properties that account for basic equality: the 
capacities to feel pain and affection; to engage in abstract, 
practical, and moral reasoning; and to be the substantial authors 
of their own lives (pp. 88-111). These properties that “host” 
basic equality are unique to human beings among all known 
living creatures, in degree if not kind (pp. 86, 175). 
Steps Two and Three rely on a concept from mathematics 
known as a range property, which made a fleeting (and not 
 
of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a 
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to 
enjoy that benefit.”). And even if poverty’s constitutional implications remain largely 
judicially unenforced, basic equality’s constitutional implications could be—and, some 
would argue, should be—taken up by the political branches. See generally LAWRENCE G. 
SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE 101–02 (2004) (“Basic welfare payments and public education at the 
elementary and secondary levels ought to be understood as constitutional entitlements, 
the primary provision of which is the constitutional responsibility of nonjudicial 
governmental bodies.”). I fully agree with Sager’s argument, though this Review is not 
the proper place to elaborate. 
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widely known) appearance in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.15 
To understand what a range property is, think of the set of 
points that are found in the interior of a circle (pp. 117-119). 
Two distinct points within the circle have scalar differences if 
they have different locations in relation to the circle’s center. 
But those scalar differences have no relevance as regards the 
interiority of a circle. The circle’s interiority is a range property: 
the two above-mentioned points fully and equally satisfy the 
range property of interiority, despite their having scalar 
differences that serve to distinguish them in relation to other 
properties (such as their location in relation to the center). 
The Second Step of Waldron’s argument is that the host 
properties that underpin basic equality are range properties (p. 
247). Though there are scalar differences across individuals in 
respect of each host property, such differences are irrelevant for 
purposes of basic equality. So long as an individual’s host 
properties fall within the range, she is equal to all other humans 
with in-range host properties for purposes of basic equality. 
Scalar differences as to those properties may be relevant for 
other purposes, some of which may be very important. For 
example, different capacities to engage in moral reasoning (one 
of the host properties) may affect the quality of the moral life 
one leads. But Waldron claims that scalar differences as to the 
host properties are irrelevant as regards basic equality so long as 
those differences fall within the range, precisely because the host 
properties are range properties in relation to basic equality.  
To appreciate Step Three of Waldron’s argument, think 
back again to the interiority of a circle. Though range property 
eliminates the significance of scalar differences between all 
points within the circle, range property does not thereby 
eliminate differences among all possible points. Points outside 
the circle are not within the range property of interiority. 
Likewise, Waldron’s reliance on range properties to ground 
basic equality raises the question of whether basic equality holds 
for individuals whose host properties fall outside of the range—
for instance the profoundly disabled,16 late stage Alzheimer’s 
patients, infants, fetuses, and (arguably) Hitler. Step Three of 
 
 15.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 508. 
 16.  Waldron provides a sensitive, carefully nuanced definition of profoundly 
disabled (pp. 217-220). 
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Waldron’s argument explains why basic equality should extend 
to all these beings.17 
Taken together, Waldron’s elegant three-step argument 
leads to the conclusion that basic equality applies to all human 
beings (continuous equality), and only to human beings 
(distinctive equality). But how powerful is each step? 
A. STEP ONE 
1. Epistemic Modesty 
The properties identified in Step One are the crux of 
Waldron’s argument for basic equality. This is because the other 
two steps presuppose that those properties adequately justify 
basic equality, as they merely (though crucially) work out the 
implications of two complicating realities: first, that people do 
not have equal measure of the properties (Step Two); and 
second, that some people have virtually none (or none) of one 
(or more) of the properties (Step Three). 
The strength of Waldron’s argument accordingly hangs on 
the firmness of Step One’s conclusions. And how strong are 
they? Two factors account for the epistemic modesty of Step 
One’s conclusions. The first is how those properties are 
identified and justified. The second is the connection Waldron 
thinks those properties bear to the conclusion of basic equality. 
It is useful to examine the second factor before proceeding to 
the first. 
a. Supervenience 
Waldron uses the technical philosophical term 
supervenience to describe the relationship between the 
properties and basic equality (pp. 61-66). He says basic equality 
“supervene[s] upon” those properties (pp. 57, 111). When one 
property supervenes upon another property it means that the 
former cannot exist without the latter. This does not mean, 
however, that the former is reducible to, or is causally connected 
to, the latter (pp. 61). Thus Waldron does not claim that the host 
properties “logically compel[]” a belief or conclusion as to 
 
 17.  But see infra note 60 (addressing scattered statements in the book to the effect 
that range property is not relied upon to justify basic equality’s extension to the 
profoundly disabled). 
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human equality (pp. 135-136). It simply is to say that any being 
that possesses the host properties will also possess the property 
of basic equality, though the ways in which the former 
determines the latter are not straightforward or mechanical (pp. 
61-62). 
Waldron provides an example of this type of relationship 
from the subfield of philosophy known as philosophy of mind. 
Supervenience is invoked to describe the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical brain. Consciousness, it is said, 
supervenes upon the brain’s physical structures and activities. 
Supervenience captures the notion that consciousness is reliant 
or dependent upon neural activity, whether or not consciousness 
is reducible to, or caused by, the brain’s physical processes.18 
By invoking supervenience, Waldron takes the position that 
basic equality bears a significant, but unspecifiable, relationship 
to the properties. What can be said is that basic equality is 
neither logically entailed by, nor caused by, the properties. The 
supervenient properties serve as the ‘host’ for basic equality in 
some ultimately indescribable respect.19 Waldron’s reliance on 
supervenience is one factor that accounts for the epistemic 
modesty of his book’s conclusions. 
An important question Waldron doesn’t adequately address 
is why supervenience is the appropriate logic to ground 
arguments for, and conclusions concerning, basic equality.20 In 
some domains of knowledge we have higher expectations of 
demonstration than supervenience promises and delivers. Why 
shouldn’t we expect more than supervenience here? This 
question’s significance is bolstered by this Review’s ultimate 
claim that Waldron’s arguments more readily support a property 
that is conceptually distinct from basic equality.21 That critique 
puts added pressure on the need to justify supervenience’s 
 
 18.  For an unusual purely physical account of consciousness, see DANIEL 
DENNETT, THE EVOLUTION OF MINDS: FROM BACTERIA TO BACH AND BACK (2017). 
Some moral philosophers also invoke supervenience, to describe the relation between 
facts and moral conclusions. See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT 
REASONS 3, 33 (2013) (explaining supervenience in relation to “normative and non-
normative facts”). 
 19.  Waldron regularly uses ‘host’ as a stand-in for supervenience (e.g., p. 86). 
 20.  See pp. 61-66, 135-136 (introducing supervenience, though not justifying its 
applicability to the context of equality, perhaps because “supervenience is defended 
intuitively” in the other areas where it is used). 
 21.  See infra Part II.B.4. 
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appropriateness for basic equality, for if the critique succeeds—
meaning that Waldron’s arguments better justify something 
conceptually distinct from equality—then it becomes all the 
more necessary to explain why supervenience should be invoked 
to bridge the gap between that something else and equality. 
b. Methodology for Identifying the Properties 
The second reason for Step One’s epistemic modesty is that 
Waldron’s method for identifying and justifying the host 
properties relies on the reader’s predisposition to accept basic 
equality. To his credit, Waldron is up front about this. The 
following is representative of what he says numerous times: “We 
might begin with some conviction about equality or some 
commitment to it . . . and that might inform our search for an 
underlying property. And then we buy into the whole thing as a 
package” (p. 64).22 
Waldron does not claim that the properties “compel a belief 
in human equality” (pp. 135-136). Rather, the book aims to 
“make sense” of “[o]ur decision to take up the moral principle of 
equality” (pp. 135-136).23 And this “making sense” is not 
intended to even rise to the level of a “mode of endorsement” 
(p. 135). Instead, in “making sense” of equality, Waldron hopes 
to make it “intelligible,” to both egalitarians and non-
egalitarians, why egalitarians find equality appealing (pp. 135-
136).24 
Waldron’s account thus presupposes the appeal of the 
foundational principle it aims to justify. For this reason, 
 
 22.  See also p. 65 (“It is possible that . . . [w]e come into the discussion with a rough 
conviction that we are one another’s equals, or a determination to behave as though we 
were; and that informs the way we look for (and what we say about) the properties on 
which, upon reflection, we say that equality is based.”); id. at 66 (“[W]e are not looking 
for a descriptive property to drive us toward equality or to prove that equality is valid. 
Rather, we are looking for a descriptive property whose conjunction with our 
prescriptive position will help make sense of the whole egalitarian package.”). 
 23.  See also p. 252. Other contemporary philosophers also invoke the language of 
“making sense,” though some use the term differently than Waldron does. See, e.g., 
TERRY PINKARD, DOES HISTORY MAKE SENSE? HEGEL ON THE HISTORICAL SHAPES 
OF JUSTICE 13–19 (2017) (using “‘making sense”’ to describe the thinking process Hegel 
thought appropriate to the domain of “‘concept,”’ which Hegel thought was susceptible 
to absolute human understanding). 
 24.  See also p. 137 (“[I]n accounting for the appeal of foundational principles, we 
are not in a position to invoke anything more rigorous than the idea of such a principle 
making sense . . .”). 
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Waldron’s project of “making sense” of equality may not be very 
useful, or sensible, unless it were directed to an audience that 
already accepted, or at least were strongly disposed to accepting, 
basic equality. And Waldron recognizes this. Echoing the 
Aristotelian notion that people become habituated to virtue,25 
Waldron suggests that “[s]eeing people in a certain way is 
perhaps inseparable from resolving to treat them as one 
another’s equals, and somebody who has not resolved to treat 
them as his equals may complain that he really doesn’t ‘get’ the 
description under which they are one another’s equals” (p. 65). 
This concession seems to be in tension with half of Waldron’s 
making-sense project, for if someone not already on board with 
equality is not expected to “get” the idea of equality, can 
Waldron make basic equality intelligible to non-egalitarians?26 In 
any event, even as regards those of us who already accept basic 
equality, Waldron advises “[w]e may have to embrace the 
accusation, often put forward by anti-egalitarians” that we “see 
people as equals, descriptively, only because we are already 
determined, prescriptively, to treat them as equals” (p. 66) 
(emphasis omitted). 
Whether basic equality is appealing to people is an 
empirical question. I suspect that continuous equality holds 
substantial appeal to most citizens of today’s liberal 
democracies. But that conclusion does not carry over to most 
societies during most of history—even very recent history, 
including recent American history. For example, it seems 
unlikely that slaveholders, or white citizens in the Jim Crow era, 
accepted (or were inclined to accept) continuous equality.27 And 
 
 25.  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 1103a 14–25 (Terence Irwin 
trans., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 2nd ed. 1999). 
 26.  Part of making sense’s task is to make equality intelligible to non-egalitarians 
(pp. 135-136). 
 27.  The truth of the statement above in text is historically contingent, for it is 
possible to imagine a world in which slaveholders accepted continuous equality, believing 
slavery to be a divine punishment for sin, for example. Be that as it may, the Supreme 
Court’s words in Dred Scott would seem to constitute evidence that Whites did not view 
Black slaves as such. In holding that people “whose ancestors were negroes of the 
African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves” were not 
citizens of the United States for purposes of the Constitution, Chief Justice Taney’s 
opinion stated that slaves “were considered “as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, 
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet 
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who 
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.” Dred Scott v. Sanford, 
60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857). 
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Blacks are not the only subpopulation that have been thought to 
be exceptions to basic equality.28 Most societies for most of 
human history had hereditary and caste-type social structures 
that fixed social roles on the basis of what were seen as “intrinsic 
or inborn differences among people.”29 How persuasive would 
One Another’s Equals have been to people in these societies? 
The answer, even according to Waldron, would seem to be “not 
much.” 
A cynic might take this to mean that the book merely 
preaches to the choir as it provides a post-hoc rationalization of 
a widely held contemporary intuition.30 This grossly undersells 
One Another’s Equals value, but I must lay some groundwork to 
explain why. 
2. The Three Properties 
Let us now turn to the three properties that Waldron 
believes jointly play host to basic equality. The first is the 
capacity to feel pain and affection (pp. 88-91). Although non-
human animals also have these capacities to varying degrees, 
Waldron plausibly claims that distinctive equality supervenes 
upon the capacity for affection as it tails towards love (pp. 90-
91). “[T]he capacity to recognize and identify with another 
person, to involve oneself existentially in the way things are and 
how things go for the other person, and to both lose oneself and 
find oneself in such a relationship”—a genuinely lovely 
description of love—appears to be uniquely human (p. 91). 
Waldron’s second host property is the capacity to reason. 
He identifies three distinctive sorts of reasoning capacities. 
Abstract reasoning relies on imagination, and is the prerequisite 
for such apparently exclusive human phenomena as religion (p. 
95) and the recognition of one’s continuity over time (pp. 95-
96).31 Practical reason is the capacity to “discern and weigh 
 
 28.  See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
19–24 (1991) (describing the hierarchical society bottomed on non-egalitarianism that 
characterized America just before and after the Revolution). 
 29.  See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY 43 (2013). 
 30.  Cf. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND 65, 76, 86 (2012) (arguing that 
moral reasoning evolved to seek justification rather than truth, and that moral reasoning 
provides only “post hoc rationalizations of gut feelings”). 
 31.  See also JED RUBINFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 131–44 (2001) (providing an 
extended and illuminating discussion of the idea that humans are “beings-over-time”); 
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reasons and relate them to one another” (p. 96). And moral 
reasoning gives rise to the “momentous capacity of counter-
causal freedom—an ability to think and act independently of 
‘the determining causes of the world of sense[,]’” thereby 
“rais[ing] us above our own animality” (p. 100).32 Waldron thinks 
all three reasoning capacities are unique to humans, and hence 
are predicates for distinctive equality (p. 95). While this is 
ultimately an empirical claim, it is not inconsistent with present 
scientific understandings.33 
Waldron’s third host property is the capacity for personal 
autonomy. Relying heavily on Joseph Raz, Waldron identifies 
autonomy with the possibility of “authoring or being part-author 
of her life” (p. 106). Humans “have the ability more or less 
consciously to lead a life for themselves, to see their lives from 
the inside out, so to speak, and to make choices in the light of 
that seeing” (p. 107). Like the capacity to reason, personal 
autonomy seems to be uniquely human. 
Waldron does not think that any one of the three properties 
is sufficient on its own to ground basic equality.34 There is no 
“little nugget of humanity—some unitary soul within . . . that [is] 
the host of our dignity and the explanation of our worth” (p. 
255). It is the several properties taken together, Waldron thinks, 
that account for basic equality. 
The three properties unquestionably are important 
characteristics of human beings. And, as Waldron thinks, they 
may set humans beings apart from all other animals. Even so, 
what is the argument that the three properties ground basic 
equality’s conclusion that people are “fundamentally one 
another’s equals” (p. 10)? It is at this crucial point that the 
epistemic modesty of supervenience and “making sense” kick in: 
 
but see Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3, 25 (1971) (arguing for 
a discontinuity between one’s selves over time where “there has been any marked change 
of character or style of life or any marked loss of memory”). 
 32.  See also p. 101 (whereas the astronomical perspective “‘annihilates, as it were, 
my importance as an animal creature,’” a human being’s moral self-awareness “‘infinitely 
raises my worth as an intelligence’”). 
 33.  See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 18, at 98–101, 219–20 (summarizing present 
state of knowledge regarding the scope of non-human animal reasoning). 
 34.  A candidate host property Waldron almost summarily rejects is self-
consciousness. I would have liked to learn why. Self-consciousness strikes me as a serious 
contender. Indicative of its foundational character, all three host properties can be 
readily derived from it. 
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basic equality relies on the host properties in the unspecified 
respect that supervenience conveys, so as to make basic equality 
intelligible, though not a logically compelled conclusion. 
Waldron is surely correct when he says his arguments for basic 
equality are “very complicated” and “complex” (p. 254-255). 
3. The Relational Account 
Can more be said to ground basic equality than this? 
Perhaps. Waldron summarizes the three properties as “rational 
and moral characteristics” (p. 175), but we can go further. 
Waldron’s first two host properties, and perhaps his third as 
well,35 are relational capacities that account for the uniquely 
social beings that humans are.36 The capacities for pain and 
affection (particularly love) enable people to transcend instinct 
and narrow self-interest (pp. 197-198). Likewise, abstract 
reasoning that gives rise to a continuity of self that can be held 
accountable in the future for her present acts, together with 
practical and moral reasoning (pp. 96, 102), support a person’s 
capacities to overcome the urge to act only pursuant to instinct 
and present self-interest. These capacities facilitate the most 
intimate of enduring relationships, and also massive cooperative 
projects with people far removed from us in space and time.37 
And as to those massive shared projects, it is the capacity to 
reason, which is intertwined with humans’ unique linguistic 
capabilities, that permits inter-generational transmissions that 
obviate the need for each person and generation to reinvent the 
wheel. This inter-generationality permits the refinement of joint 
 
 35.  Personal autonomy, Waldron’s third property, bears an uncertain relationship 
to the relational account. On the one hand, although some choices resulting from the 
exercise of personal autonomy might support social relations, other choices might not. 
On the other hand, personal autonomy may be unavoidably social-dependent insofar as 
our “relation to self is mediated everywhere by our relations to others” and by our 
society’s “institutions and practices.” See PINKARD, supra note 23, at 168; see also 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011). 
 36.  This point is not lost on Waldron, though it does not play a central role in his 
account. See p. 87 (speaking of “the interpersonal relations [that the host properties] give 
rise to over a whole life”); see also p. 93 (noting that reason is linked to “our highest 
relations with one another and with the divine”); p. 198 (the host properties are 
“capacities which are relational in character” insofar as they “are not just features of the 
individual who has them; they relate him or her to others”). 
 37.  See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING 
THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER (2014); SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011). 
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projects, allowing humans to make profound advances over time 
in culture, science, and civilization. 
These relational capacities may be what accounts for human 
beings’ success from an evolutionary perspective. We humans 
are not the largest, strongest, or fastest of creatures. Our 
accomplishments as a species are largely owing to the quality 
and extent of our social relations, which are made possible by 
the very host properties that Waldron identifies. 
This relational account of the properties can bolster Step 
One’s argument for basic equality.38 These relational properties, 
and their social consequences, appear to be unique to humans, 
and for that reason advance the case for distinctive equality. 
And because the properties beget their awesome relational 
consequences only insofar as they are shared by other human 
beings, the relational account also reinforces the case for 
continuous equality. 
4. Equality or Sharedness? 
Whether or not one accepts the relational account’s gloss on 
Waldron’s argument, the case for basic equality remains 
uncertain. Step One identifies a certain commonality, or 
sharedness, of human beings, and explains its critical importance 
(p. 205). But sharedness is not the same thing as equality. Even if 
individuals A and B both share x, there is much aside from x 
(say, y and z) that they will not have in common. And equating 
sharedness with equality seems particularly questionable in a 
circumstance where people have different measures of the 
something they do share (for instance, A may have x1 whereas B 
has x2), as range properties permit. These two considerations 
strongly suggest that sharedness is conceptually different from 
equality. Treating sharedness as equality accordingly may be 
what philosophers call a category mistake.39 
To be sure, Waldron’s formulation that A and B are 
“fundamentally equal” (p. 10) tolerates inequalities between A 
and B. But the conclusion holds true only if the ways in which A 
 
 38.  The relational account also bolsters Step Two’s argument, discussed below. 
 39.  See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 58 
(1994). The “contorted intellectual gymnastics” needed to make sense of equality may, 
instead of constituting necessary “analytic complexity,” be additional evidence of a 
category mistake, like heliocentrism and its associated epicycles. See p. 255. 
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and B are not the same are not “fundamental.”40 More precisely, 
if individual A is characterized by the set (x1, y) and B by (x2, z), 
then A is “fundamentally equal” to B if, and only if, the 
differences between x1 and x2, and between y and z, are not 
“fundamental.” Step Two of Waldron’s argument—the claim 
that the host properties are range properties—addresses why x1-
x2 differentials should not matter for purposes of basic equality. 
But as far as I can tell, One Another’s Equals does not put 
forward a similar argument as regards y-z differentials. 
And doing so would not be easy. It would have to be 
established that there are no possible differences across human 
beings, apart from the host properties, that are capable of 
destroying the fundamental equality between persons A and B. 
To put it another way, it would have to be shown that the host 
properties are the only relevant criteria for assessing whether A 
and B are fundamentally equal. The absence of any such 
argument in One Another’s Equals would seem to constitute 
additional evidence that the book makes more of a case for 
sharedness than equality. 
This does not mean equality plays no role in Waldron’s 
book. Waldron thinks “the benefit of basic principles of human 
worth and human dignity accrues equally to every human 
being.” (p. 151). In other words, equality squarely comes into 
play in respect of basic equality’s prescriptive implications. If we 
pay heed to the distinction between basic equality’s justifications 
and its prescriptive contents, we must consider whether the 
book’s sharedness argument is adequate to support the 
prescriptive work Waldron thinks basic equality performs. Part 
III takes up this question. 
5. Must Equality Be Renamed? 
Imagine it is agreed that One Another’s Equals provides 
more of an argument for sharedness than for equality. Does this 
clarification have any practical implications? 
 
 40.  Waldron appears to believe that arguments for basic equality are immune to 
Peter Westen’s trenchant critiques of equality (p. 67). See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF 
EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF “EQUALITY” IN MORAL 
AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990). But the critique above in the text suggests otherwise, 
insofar as some notion of fundamental humanity, rather than equality, performs the 
analytic work. 
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It might be suggested that this is only a pedantic, and 
ultimately semantic, point. But I think not. As explained above, 
there is a real conceptual difference between sharedness and 
equality. Clarifying the nature of Waldron’s argument allows us 
to better understand the limits of what that argument 
establishes. Moreover, the words we use can have framing 
effects that shape our perceptions and normative conclusions. 
For example, the terminology of equality might put a thumb on 
the scales of Waldron’s normative conclusion that all people 
should be treated equally. By contrast, sharedness—the 
understanding that people share crucial things by virtue of their 
humanity, but also differ from their brethren in crucial ways—
may be a more neutral way of staging the normative question of 
what each person is entitled to. And there are other substantive 
differences between equality and sharedness. Historian Edmund 
Morgan’s cavalier dismissal of the truth of equality41 is consistent 
with many uncensored views I have encountered from even left-
leaning philosopher friends of mine. I suspect that sharedness 
may be a far more defensible position than equality. 
On the other hand, I do not mean to suggest that we 
necessarily must discard the label “equality.” Equality is an 
expression that has a long pedigree in the West generally, and in 
the United States in particular. As Waldron rightly observes, 
equality bears an “important resonance of indicating the sort of 
heritage we are struggling against and the heritage of struggling 
against it . . . . Words remind us of movements. And ‘equality’ 
reminds us of that movement in our civilization” (p. 75, see also 
pp. 228-229). 
This crucial point can be linked up with the book’s 
epistemic modesty in a way that may make the best sense of 
Waldron’s project, and that makes clear why that project is so 
important. Waldron’s goal of making sense of equality means 
that One Another’s Equals is largely directed to an audience for 
whom equality already is appealing. That the book provides 
more of a justification for sharedness than for equality bolsters 
Waldron’s concession that the book’s arguments don’t logically 
compel a belief in basic equality. But these concessions in no 
way undermine the book’s significance. One Another’s Equals 
aims to flesh out one of our political community’s foundational 
 
 41.  See MORGAN, supra note 4. 
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normative commitments by providing the most holistic, 
compelling account of basic equality that it can. That account 
can then be used by those of us who have adopted the 
commitment to determine if we should continue to do so, and if 
so what the commitment’s normative and prescriptive 
entailments should be. 
There is great value in the human project of examining our 
commitments, pace Morgan’s anxiety. And that enterprise is 
valuable even as to commitments that make no objective truth 
claims, but are “merely” the normative commitments we’ve 
undertaken. This is so because commitments play exceedingly 
important work for humans.42 Commitments provide coherence 
to our lives over time, and are among human beings’ most 
important cultural tools for facilitating the interpersonal 
cooperation that is necessary for the disparate shared projects 
that are pursued among intimates and among strangers. Even if 
a cornerstone commitment is not susceptible of logical 
demonstration, and in that sense might be said to be a fictive 
axiom, it is sensible to submit the commitment to sustained 
examination at some point in time.43 Doing so allows those who 
have adopted the commitment to have justifiable confidence that 
it should be retained. 
Of course sustained examination may lead to other 
consequences. The commitment may end up being flatly 
rejected, or (probably more frequently) reconfigured. 
Reconfiguration often is a complex phenomenon. Sometimes 
(perhaps typically) reconfiguration is not recognized as such; 
people assume the way they have come to understand a 
commitment is as it always has been. And reconfiguration 
sometimes is so substantial as to amount to a wholesale rewriting 
of the original commitment’s substance—what we might call a 
rewrite reconfiguration. Consider what occurred with basic 
equality’s conceptual cognate of dignity. Dignity originally 
served as a concept that differentiated among people and 
 
 42.  See generally RUBINFELD, supra note 31, at 92–101. 
 43.  The time for this likely is not ripe when the commitment makes its initial 
entrance. It typically takes time for a new commitment’s implications to be incrementally 
worked out, and for those initial workings-out to be subject to interrogation. The 
temporally extended nature of our cultural projects explains the at-first surprising 
phenomenon that Waldron aims to provide an account of basic equality so long after that 
concept first appeared in western culture. Whereas equality had to be a largely 
unexamined axiom in Jefferson’s day, it may be susceptible to deeper justification today. 
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generated social hierarchies.44 At some point in time, dignity was 
reconfigured so that it referred to what was owed to all human 
beings by virtue of their common humanity (p. 3). These two 
usages of the term “dignity” share little in common. Indeed, they 
are nearly polar opposites. 
More generally, reconfiguration seems to be a concomitant 
of the human practice of receiving, and transmitting, a 
heritage—the intergenerational project of building upon what is 
received from our predecessors. This intertemporal human 
project may be hindered were each individual contributor to 
insist on introducing her own idiosyncratic terminology, even if 
that terminology were conceptually clearer. There may be 
epistemic benefits to a community-wide discourse with shared 
vocabulary.45 
So by continuing to use the language of equality, Waldron 
makes us participants in an intergenerational project of working 
out the implications of a shared, though invariably shifting, 
commitment. Reconfigurement, instead of outright replacement, 
reflects that our communal identity is linked with those who 
earlier introduced and worked with the commitment that we still 
today call equality. And reconfigurement may be epistemically 
advantageous. Waldron’s continued use of the term equality, 
notwithstanding sharedness’ conceptual superiority, may be best 
justified in this light. 
B. STEP TWO 
I believe that Step Two—Waldron’s importation of range 
property into equality—is among the book’s most original and 
valuable contributions. Waldron gives three powerful reasons 
why the host properties are range properties for purposes of 
basic equality. He relies most frequently on “our sense of the 
specialness that that property, held to whatever degree, confers 
upon the individual beings who have it” (p. 139, see also pp. 125-
 
 44.  See MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY 11–12 (2012). 
 45.  Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political 
Architecture of Overlapping Spheres, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 744 (“[M]embership in the 
community of Rawls scholars does not entail treating Rawls’ writings as an 
unchallengeable canon of truth. To the contrary, his work serves as the starting point for 
critical analysis and, not infrequently, refinement. Rawls thus becomes a focal point 
around which a sustained scholarly conversation occurs, which holds out the promise of 
generating deeper understandings than if each scholar aimed to develop her own 
approach ex nihilo.”). 
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126, 199). While persuasive to me, this justification admittedly 
has an ipse dixit character to it. The second and third reasons can 
be understood as explications of this first one. 
Waldron’s second reason is that the host properties “house 
the distinctiveness of each person” in the sense that it is each 
person’s differential exercise of the properties that accounts for 
her uniqueness as an individual (pp. 155-156, see also p. 158). 
The very capacities that allow for people’s individuation in terms 
of merit and demerit thus account for their sameness as regards 
basic equality. This might sound paradoxical at first, but there is 
no internal inconsistency. This argument strikes me as very 
powerful, though it might be criticized as overly valorizing 
autonomy and individuation. 
Waldron’s third argument as to why the host properties are 
range properties may be the strongest of all. He says that 
“[s]ometimes the choice to focus on a certain range property 
may be explained in relational terms. Interaction of an important 
or valuable kind between beings may require that they both have 
properties of a certain sort within a given range” (p. 140). The 
relational account developed above bolsters this argument. The 
host properties are range properties because their relational 
consequences are not dependent on everyone having equal 
measures of them. So long as a person’s capacities fall within the 
range that permit them to play a role in the massive social 
project, they are full members of the human club.46 
C. STEP THREE 
But what about individuals whose host properties fall 
outside the range (pp. 217-225)? The main examples Waldron 
discusses are infants and the profoundly disabled (hereinafter, 
the PD). To this we might add late stage Alzheimer’s patients 
(hereinafter, the LSA).47 Step Three claims that basic equality 
fully applies to all such persons. Waldron provides two reasons 
why, though he appears to ultimately endorse only one of them 
(pp. 248, 254). 
 
 46.  Not only is scalar equality unnecessary, but interpersonal variations as to 
Waldronian host properties probably are evolutionarily beneficial to humans, which is a 
crucial consideration to the relational account. 
 47.  Another candidate worth considering is people whose moral reasoning is 
profoundly stunted, like Hitler (p. 231). 
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Waldron first suggests that the host properties might be 
understood not as actual traits, but as potential traits (p. 248). 
He then provides a definition of potential48 that would 
encompass the PD and LSA.49 Potential thus operates as a 
leveler among human beings, such that “the profoundly disabled 
person and the person who is not profoundly disabled are on a 
par” (p. 247) for purposes of basic equality. More precisely, 
understanding the host properties as potentials would mean that 
virtually all human beings fall within the range property. 
Although a person literally born without a brain may not qualify 
under Waldron’s definition,50 virtually every other human being 
would. Potential thus expands range property so broadly as to 
exclude virtually no one. 
Waldron ultimately rejects this option of reconfiguring the 
traits as mere potentials (pp. 249-250)—but not for the reasons 
we might have expected. We might have expected him to reject 
potential on the ground that the concept of range property 
presupposes a range—that is to say, a limit that excludes some 
candidates, such that the range property cannot be universally 
inclusive (pp. 128, 130). And this general analytic point has 
substantial force in relation to the specific issue under 
consideration. Waldron invoked range property to explain why 
people’s scalar differences as to their host properties do not 
undermine their basic equality. Range property addressed that 
challenge by insisting that some interpersonal differences are 
consistent with basic equality—that so long as the people’s 
differences fall within some range, the differences don’t matter 
for purposes of basic equality (p. 222). The work that range 
property performs—eliminating the significance of scalar 
differences—thus trades on an implicit concession that the host 
properties will not justify basic equality for everybody.51 To take 
 
 48.  A person has a potential trait if “it is something represented organically (if only 
as organic infrastructure) in the life of every human,” it “is to be understood as 
something unfolding over time, presenting itself in different ways at different stages of 
the human life whose dignity is being considered,” and “it is to be understood as 
something fragile, whose unfolding will in every instance be shadowed from beginning to 
end by the possibility of organic or genetic failure or damage” (p. 247). 
 49.  Waldron’s explanation as to why basic equality extends to infants is fully 
persuasive. See Section IIIC, below. 
 50.  Such a person may not satisfy the first part of Waldron’s definition that the 
individual have “something represented organically (if only as organic infrastructure) in 
the life of every human” (p. 247). 
 51.  At several points Waldron seems to be explicit about this. See p. 123 (“The 
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range property’s argumentative benefit and thereafter 
reconfigure the range so it includes everybody asymptotically 
approaches a bait-and-switch. To invoke another metaphor, 
concluding that everyone falls within the range is just a bridge-
too-far. Finally, if everyone is within range, then something 
other than the concept of a range property seems to be doing the 
real justificatory work. Call this the set of Potential Objections. 
But as indicated above, Waldron does not reject potential 
on account of the Potential Objections. He rejects potential 
because he fears it is insufficient to make sense of all of basic 
equality’s prescriptive implications: “there may seem to be an 
insufficient nexus between what we are supposed to be making 
sense of (the rights) and what is supposed to make sense of it 
(the potential)” (p. 249).52 It “makes little sense,” Waldron says, 
to think that mere potential gives rise to rights such as free 
speech, personal liberty, and freedom of religion to persons “for 
whom the unfolding of that potential is blocked or curtailed” (p. 
250). Likewise, Waldron is not confident that potential makes 
sense of the respect that is demanded by basic equality, namely 
“a form of deference and accommodation” that “include[s] 
recognition and acknowledgement of someone as an intellect 
with a point of view and opinions of her own.” (p. 250). 
Waldron’s approach here is revealing. There was an obvious 
alternative to remedy an insufficient nexus between the 
justifications for basic equality and its prescriptive implications: 
reworking the implications. But Waldron doesn’t even consider 
it. This suggests that basic equality’s prescriptive content may be 
the dominant driver behind Step Three. More generally, while 
the book’s structure suggests that basic equality’s prescriptions 
are derivative of the justifications for basic equality, the 
derivation may run in just the opposite direction. 
Moreover, Waldron’s concern that potential is insufficient 
to ground basic equality relies upon a non-axiomatic conception 
of its prescriptions—a one-size-fits-all approach that doesn’t 
permit basic equality’s concrete demands to vary across people. 
For if basic equality’s prescriptions might be tailored across 
 
range-property idea is not supposed to meet th[e] challenge . . . [of] the massive 
differences among us that arise in the context of profound disability.”). 
 52.  See also p. 248 (noting his uncertainty in whether “there is a strong enough 
connection here between the range property so conceived and the prescriptive force of 
basic equality”). 
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different people, the insufficient nexus concern could be fully 
remedied without jettisoning potential by simply calibrating 
potential’s prescriptive implications as necessary.53 
In any event, Waldron ultimately concludes that the 
properties that are “supposed to underpin basic equality” must 
be understood “in terms of the actual presence of capacities like 
rationality or moral agency within the human range as ordinarily 
defined” (p. 250). But if so, what is to become of the PD and 
LSA in particular, and of continuous equality more generally? In 
a remarkable act of philosophical alchemy, Waldron propounds 
a definition of “actual presence” that encompasses the PD and 
LSA. Actual presence for purposes of basic equality includes 
three states beyond the case of an ordinarily functioning adult 
human being. There is actual presence of a property where the 
property is “at the early stages of its unfolding”; for a person 
who “may have suffered the misfortune of the unfolding of this 
capacity going badly wrong”; and for anyone who “may be at the 
end of a life, in which the capacities that underlie human dignity 
begin, more or less quickly, to undergo their inevitable 
decline . . .” (p. 251). The last two sub-definitions are perfectly 
tailored to include the PD and LSA. 
This is extraordinary. On Waldron’s approach, there is 
actual presence of a host property in someone who cannot 
presently exercise it, never will, and even never has. This 
“complex” (pp. 250-251) definition of “actual” is not only 
peculiar, but substantially drains the term “actual” of its 
meaning. After all, under Waldron’s definition, “actual 
presence” is at least as capacious a category as “potential 
presence.”54 This is not only deeply surprising, but it renders his 
definition vulnerable to the above-identified Potential 
Objections. To recapitulate: Defining “actual” in a manner that 
encompasses everybody is inconsistent with the very concept of 
a range property, which presupposes some out-of-range domain; 
and concluding that the PD and LSA have in-range host 
properties is a switch-and-bait and bridge-too-far. We can now 
 
 53.  Interestingly, Waldron ultimately adopts a tailored approach to basic equality’s 
prescriptions vis-à-vis the PD. See infra Section III.0. This reflects, I believe, an 
ambivalence as to whether basic equality is one-size-fits-all or susceptible of tailoring. 
Later, I associate Waldron’s attraction to one-size-fits-all with his hope of generating 
absolutist prescriptions. 
 54.  While Waldron’s definition of potential may exclude a person born without a 
brain, Waldron’s definition of actual would not. 
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understand why Waldron didn’t rely on the Potential Objections 
when he rejected potential traits: his preferred solution is equally 
vulnerable to those objections. 
Criticizing Waldron’s arguments for his conclusion is not the 
same thing as rejecting the conclusion. I too have sympathy for 
the view that basic equality extends to the PD and LSA. 
However, the best justification, it seems to me, has nothing to do 
with the host properties, but rests on something else entirely. 
Basic equality applies to the PD and LSA on account of what 
might be called the Groupism Argument: they “belong[] to the 
human community” and quite simply are “one of us” (pp. 245-
246).55 Several powerful considerations that Waldron discusses at 
various points in the book support the Groupism Argument. 
First, human potentials have a typical trajectory—undeveloped, 
developing, developed, and decaying—and “each stage in the 
trajectory is shadowed by a variety of ways in which things may 
go wrong, ways in which the organism, developed so far, may be 
harmed or disabled or fail to develop further” (p. 243).56 “The 
possibility of these failures and disabilities is part of the human 
condition” (p. 243). As a result, each PD and LSA is “one of us; 
like us they had potentials and, just as in our case, those 
potentials were fragile and vulnerable” (p. 243).57 
Second, the PD and LSA are the brothers and sisters, and 
other close relations, of people whose host properties are in-
range.58 The PD and LSA are sustained by the “respect, concern, 
and love from other humans” (p. 245).59 Every PD “is related to 
someone” who has in-range properties, “and in that sense the 
profoundly disabled person belongs to the human community” 
(p. 246). Third, “[t]here is no other community of carers for the 
profoundly disabled person, no other community except the 
 
 55.  See also p. 251 (noting that there are “stages, vicissitudes, or prospects that are 
or have been or will be pertinent to the condition of us all”). 
 56.  Waldron develops these arguments in relation to his defense of distinctive 
equality, but I believe they carry over to Step Three’s argument for continuous equality. 
 57.  Echoing the original position’s ethic of reciprocity, Waldron says “the 
appropriate reflection on this fragility in the context of any given example of a person 
who is profoundly disabled must include the content that could have been me.” (p. 244). 
 58.  Waldron makes similar arguments at various points. E.g., p. 251 (arguing that 
we should “recogniz[e] as their brothers and sisters in human dignity those who have 
these more complicated features of consummated fragility and human misfortune.”). I 
think these arguments deserve promotion from bit player to center stage. 
 59.  This argument may not fully carry over to the LSA, and may be weakened by 
the fact that non-human animals can provide vital social roles as well. 
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human community to which they belong” (p. 246). 
Consequently, “[s]ocially . . . the disabled human is one of us” 
(p. 245). The PD and LSA share humanity with the rest of us in 
these ways—they are part of our group—and for these reasons 
they, too, are beneficiaries of basic equality. 
In short, the PD and LSA are included in basic equality, not 
on account of the host properties, as Waldron argues, but in 
spite of those properties’ absence. Reconfiguring Waldron’s 
argument in this manner does not mean that host properties no 
longer perform work. For the reasons explained above, the host 
properties argument is a powerful justification for the conclusion 
that basic equality extends to all persons with in-range 
properties. Among its many benefits, Wadron’s argument based 
on host properties is strongly universalist. It breaks down 
barriers based on nationality, religion, and race, as it reminds us 
of the crucial things that (virtually) all of us humans share. But 
some special extension argument is necessary for the PD and 
LSA,60 because the argument based on in-range host properties 
cannot do the job. The Groupism Argument serves as that 
extension argument. 
I can easily imagine reasons why Waldron might be 
reluctant to rely on an independent extension argument. It might 
have a different level of robustness than the primary argument. 
And a robustness differential might give rise to divergent 
prescriptive and normative implications.61 But these 
considerations cannot remedy an inadequate primary argument. 
Waldron has labored hard to generate a single general argument 
for basic equality that can cover everyone, but it is not up to the 
task. Perhaps the argument based on range property can be 
rejiggered to encompass everybody, although the Potential 
Objections suggest this would not work. Or perhaps a wholly 
new alternative justification can be developed that does not rely 
on the concept of range property, and that encompasses every 
human being. As of now, however, I have not yet seen a single 
 
 60.  Hence I align myself with Rawls rather than Waldron concerning the need for a 
special extension argument (p. 134 & n.11). Somewhat mysteriously to me, Waldron 
sometimes says he does not rely on range property to ground the basic equality of the PD 
(p. 225, and also p. 123). Fairly read, both his potentiality and actual presence arguments 
for extending basic equality to the PD rely upon the concept of a range property (pp. 
247-248, 250-251). 
 61.  I believe this concern to be a red herring. See infra Section III.B. 
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argument for basic equality that adequately justifies continuous 
equality. 
III. BASIC EQUALITY’S PRESCRIPTIVE WORK 
Three facets of Waldron’s argument should be spotlighted if 
we are to appreciate the muscular prescriptive work he thinks 
basic equality performs. Each facet amounts to an absolutist 
claim. 
First, as a threshold matter, Waldron thinks that basic 
equality extends to absolutely every human being. Basic equality 
is non-defeasible as to “terrorists, dictators, mass murderers, and 
so on” (p. 151). Second, Waldron thinks basic equality’s “benefit 
of basic principles of human worth and dignity accrues equally to 
every human being, irrespective of what he or she has done and 
what he or she is responsible for” (p. 151). Crudely put, basic 
equality’s benefits are absolute in the sense that they “accrue[] 
equally” to Mother Theresa and Hitler (p. 151). Third, basic 
equality’s normative work is absolute in the sense that it 
“trump[s] other moral principles” (p. 186). 
Do Waldron’s justifications for the principle of basic 
equality satisfactorily justify all this prescriptive work? 
A. FIRST ABSOLUTIST CLAIM 
As to the First Absolutist Claim, Waldron says “it is a 
consequence of basic equality as I understand it that Pol Pot, 
Joseph Stalin, and Adolf Hitler are to be regarded as our equals” 
(p. 149). Waldron argues that allowing basic equality to be 
defeasible in relation to evil persons would be tantamount to 
treating Hitler as a “human beast” (p. 153) or as “subhuman” 
(pp. 143, 163). This seems right. Though we surely can 
distinguish between Hitler and Mother Theresa on many other 
important grounds (pp. 150-151)—Mother Theresa lived a more 
morally excellent life—evil people are unalterably human, and in 
that sense are our equals. But I am less sanguine than Waldron 
that his arguments based on in-range host properties are 
sufficient to ground this conclusion. I am more inclined to treat 
Hitler as a being with out-of-range moral sensibilities. An 
independent extension argument is necessary for Hitler, and I 
would suggest that the Groupism Argument serves that role. 
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B. SECOND ABSOLUTIST CLAIM 
The book’s Second Absolutist Claim is that “the benefit of 
basic principles of human worth and dignity accrues equally to 
every human being, irrespective of what he or she has done and 
what he or she is responsible for” (p. 151). Likewise, Waldron 
writes “[i]f principles of basic equality, equal worth, and human 
dignity do any sort of work at all, they have to generate 
normative conclusions about equal concern and respect for 
Hitler and [Albert] Schweitzer” (p. 151). And he tells us that 
“[t]he work that basic equality does for us and among us 
includes the work that it has to do for terrorists, dictators, mass 
murderers, and so on” (p. 151). 
In truth, there is some ambiguity here as to Waldron’s 
position. Even if basic equality’s “normative conclusions about 
equal concern and respect” must do work for both Hitler and 
Albert Schweitzer, must those conclusions be identical for both 
of them? Similarly, though “the benefit of basic principles of 
human worth and dignity accrues equally to every human 
being,” does this mean that those principles’ concrete demands62 
are identical across every person, regardless of (for instance) 
“what he or she has done and what he or she is responsible for”? 
And while basic equality must “do work” for both us and 
dictators, are the final products of that work identical? Only 
affirmative answers to each of these three questions would 
qualify Waldron’s position as an absolutist claim. 
As written, I think these passages from One Another’s 
Equals are most naturally read as embracing the Second 
Absolutist Claim. Bolstering an absolutist interpretation, 
negative answers to the last paragraph’s three questions would 
leave basic equality’s prescriptive implications more open-ended 
than Waldron aspires to provide. And too, the proposition that 
basic equality’s prescriptive demands might vary across people 
sits uneasily with the book’s tendency to equate the principle of 
basic equality with its prescriptions. Also supporting an 
absolutist reading is Waldron’s explicit defense of moral 
absolutes in other writings, and his reliance on that absolutist 
view when concluding that torturing terrorists to discover a 
 
 62.  Cf. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 
GEO. L.J. 569, 586–88 (1998) (arguing that meaning may remain constant while its 
concrete applications can vary over time). 
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ticking bomb is always wrong.63 And recall that Waldron’s 
rejection of potentiality to ground the PD’s inclusion in basic 
equality presupposed that basic equality’s normative 
implications were one-size-fits-all, which is another way of 
putting the Second Absolutist Claim. 
But perhaps Waldron does not really embrace the Second 
Absolutist Claim after all. After concluding that basic equality 
extends to the PD, Waldron tells us that its normative work can 
be expected to vary in relation to them. Though “we recognize 
the profoundly disabled person as one of us,” Waldron tells us 
there can be “nuanced application of [basic equality’s] normative 
implications,” and that “there will be normative implications 
that cannot apply” (p. 252). For example, “there will be less 
concern about independence,” and “[t]here will be choices that 
are normally privileged by rights that become problematic in the 
case of the profoundly disabled” (pp. 252-253).64 
So which is it: Are basic equality’s prescriptive and 
normative implications absolute, or does basic equality permit 
“nuanced application”? Absolutism no doubt has an allure: it 
promises clear answers to questions that might be epistemically 
difficult, and constrains future decisionmakers whom we might 
not completely trust. As to the hermeneutic task of identifying 
the best interpretation of One Another’s Equals, I think the 
book is best read as propounding the Second Absolutist Claim, 
subject to only a narrow exception for “nuanced applications” 
on behalf of the PD on account of the “complicated” actual-
range rationale (analyzed above) that extends basic equality to 
the PD (pp. 250-252). Insofar as generating determinate 
prescriptions is one of Waldron’s driving motivations, an 
interpretation that generally licensed nuanced applications of 
the highly abstract principle of equality must be disfavored, for it 
would sharply undercut that goal. 
But absolutism’s benefits come with costs, as Waldron’s 
discussion of the PD illuminates. Invariable treatment of the PD 
would not be normatively sensible for the very reasons Waldron 
 
 63.  See Jeremy Waldron, What Are Moral Absolutes Like?, 18 HARV. REV. PHIL. 
4, 26 (2012) (acknowledging that he has not yet developed a definitive “answer to the 
question [of] how the absolutist deals with the burden of the humanitarian considerations 
that seem to motivate the infringement of his absolute principle.”). 
 64.  For example, the PD “may not have or be able to conceive a view or a 
preference to express as a vote in an election” (p. 253). 
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observes. While Waldron provides an argument as to why 
nuanced applications are appropriate for the PD (pp. 250-252), 
he provides no reason to think that the PD are the only 
subpopulation for whom nuanced applications might be 
appropriate. The point can be put more abstractly: even if scalar 
differences as to in-range host properties do not undermine 
people’s fundamental equality, it does not ineluctably follow that 
those differences should be irrelevant to determining basic 
equality’s concrete prescriptions. The recognition that Waldron’s 
arguments support sharedness more than equality further 
supports the proposition that differential treatment may be 
normatively appropriate on account of what people do not share. 
While allowing nuanced applications would deflate the 
prescriptive and normative payoff Waldron seems to hope for, it 
would not render his book valueless. It is true that Waldron’s 
readers wouldn’t emerge with a ready list of basic equality’s 
invariable entailments. But defending and clarifying the 
principle that human beings are fundamentally one another’s 
equals on account of crucial properties that we humans share—
what I take to be the book’s core contribution—is a critical step 
to securing the principle’s intelligent application and further 
development. 
More generally, the Second Absolutist Claim would deny 
tomorrow’s decisionmakers agency in determining basic 
equality’s appropriate normative implications.65 Absolutism 
reflects an implicit promise that all the difficult normative work 
can be completed at one point in time, such that later 
decisionmakers can rely on those conclusions and simply apply 
them to whatever may arise in the future. Absolutism thus rests 
on a belief in normativity’s equivalent of an end-of-history, as 
well as the confidence that we’ve finally reached that end-of-
history. For those doubtful of either or both of these premises, it 
 
 65.  On the one hand, this agency-ceding is in tension with Waldron’s repeated 
recognition of the non-algorithmic, non-mechanistic nature of moral reasoning. See, e.g., 
p. 160 (noting that “one of the remarkable things about moral agency” is “it won’t work 
as a machine or algorithm. The capability we have is much more subtle than that, 
nuanced and geared for novelty and capable of coming to terms with what is unusual in 
human affairs”); p. 200 (praising “Kant’s moral philosophy and the Christian 
understanding of morality [that] emphasize[s] agency, not just the passive status of being 
a child of God.”). On the other hand, such absolutism is consistent with Waldron’s past 
championing of absolute moral values. 
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seems preferable that people recognize their agency, and their 
responsibility for exercising it. 
C. THIRD ABSOLUTIST CLAIM 
Although there may be some uncertainty as to whether 
Waldron endorses the Second Absolutist Claim, he seems to 
firmly embrace the Third Absolutist Claim that basic equality 
appropriately trumps all competing moral values. The principle 
of basic equality, Waldron tells us, “has to have the power to 
override positions whose moral importance is undeniable” (p. 
149).66 For example, Waldron thinks basic equality must be able 
to “stop” arguments that would justify “torturing or 
assassinating a murderous terrorist . . . in its tracks” (pp. 186-
187). Without any qualifications or further justifications, 
Waldron concludes that basic equality trumps any and all 
competing values, such as saving innocents’ lives or securing 
political stability. 
In what follows, I will suggest that Waldron’s Third 
Absolutist Claim suffers three defects: it is substantially 
unargued, unduly agency-denying, and normatively suspect. 
1. Substantially Unargued 
Waldron tells us that “[s]ome of our deepest principles 
present themselves to us in an uncompromising and 
nonnegotiable way. They are not supposed to be norms that we 
have control over; they are not for us to tamper with” (pp. 187-
188).67 Waldron may be correct as a phenomenological matter 
that people naturally conceptualize their principles in absolutist 
terms, but Hume’s Law—which teaches that an “ought” cannot 
be derived from an “is”68—counsels that this fact cannot on its 
own serve as a normative argument for absolutism. After all, 
people might be mistaken in this regard. 
Moreover, Waldron’s phenomenological claim may not be 
descriptively correct. Perhaps absolutist sensibilities pertain only 
 
 66.  Although Waldron does not explicitly say that basic equality trumps all 
contending values, his analysis seems to presuppose this. 
 67.  Although “[n]ot all of our morality can be like this,” Waldron proposes that 
“perhaps some of the foundations have this nonnegotiable character” (p. 188). 
 68.  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739); SCANLON, supra note 18, at 33. 
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for so long as people focus on only one principle. Perhaps people 
ultimately realize that they hold more than one principle, that 
those principles sometimes can come into conflict with one 
another, and that in such circumstance one or both must give 
way to some degree. Indeed, I suspect that this more accurately 
describes what happens to principles over time. But my 
descriptive account also is subject to Hume’s Law, and 
accordingly cannot on its own qualify as a normative argument. 
After all, people might be wrong in abandoning their initial 
absolutist sensibility. 
So we are unavoidably in need of normative arguments in 
relation to absolutism. I can imagine only three possible 
arguments that can support the Third Absolutist Claim. The 
first, which might be called monism, is that there exists only a 
single, internally consistent principle.69 On this view, what 
appears to us as multiple normative principles is simply a 
mistake; properly conceived, all apparently distinct principles 
are part of a single, internally consistent grand principle. The 
second possible argument, which we might call soft pluralism, is 
that although there are multiple normative principles, all of them 
peacefully coexist; properly understood, no conflict among them 
is possible. The third, which might be called strict ordinality, 
acknowledges that there are multiple principles that potentially 
conflict, but insists that one principle always trumps all others. 
One Another’s Equals does not advance a monist claim.70 At 
one point in the book Waldron appears to endorse soft pluralism 
when he offhandedly observes that that “[i]f our morality is well-
organized, the relevant principles do not contradict one another” 
(p. 162). More consistently, however, the book endorses strict 
ordinality. It repeatedly tells us that basic equality has to 
perform “heavy lifting” (p. 145) (emphasis omitted) insofar as it 
“has to have the power to override positions whose moral 
importance is undeniable” (p. 149).71 
 
 69.  Elsewhere I have explored in detail all three possibilities. See Mark D. Rosen, 
Two Ways of Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Equality and Religious Freedom, 
4 J. L. RELIGION & ST. 117, 122–35 (2016) [hereinafter Rosen, Two Ways]. 
 70.  For an explanation of what a monist claim must consist of, see id. at 123–26. 
 71.  See also p. 148 (noting that basic equality must be “able to stand up to and if 
necessary to trump the work of certain other bona fide moral principles”); p. 186 (stating 
equality “needs . . . to be morally robust enough to trump other moral principles that 
appear to have bona fides of their own”). 
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Waldron recognizes that “this trumping power cannot be 
assumed: it has to be explained” (p. 149). But I can find very 
little explanation for this crucial point in the book. Certainly 
there are no sustained arguments on behalf of strict ordinality 
(or, as indicated above, for monism or soft pluralism).72 The 
most detailed justification for the Third Absolutist Claim 
appears in the chapter entitled A Religious Basis of Equality? 
Here it is: 
[S]ome of our deepest principles present themselves to us in 
an uncompromising and nonnegotiable way. They are not 
supposed to be norms that we have control over; they are not 
for us to tamper with. Not all of our morality can be like 
this . . . . But perhaps some of the foundations have this 
nonnegotiable character (pp. 187-188). 
And why should this be so? All Waldron tells us is that a 
religious justification for basic equality may be “necessary” to 
ground its “nonnegotiability” (p. 188). “Perhaps if we think of a 
position as commanded by God, we understand ourselves as 
more passive in the face of the principles put forward for our 
consideration than moral philosophers generally take themselves 
to be” (p. 188) (emphasis added). 
It is striking that so critical a part of Waldron’s argument 
depends upon a religious claim that cannot be expected to be 
resonant with, let alone persuasive to, a sizable swath of 
Waldron’s readers, on account of the fact that it is religiously 
bottomed.73 Moreover, it is a largely unargued religious claim 
insofar as it asserts that—but does not explain why—God would 
want this particular principle to be absolute, and for humans to 
substantially cede their agency in determining what the principle 
concretely entails in this world.74 After all, many religious 
traditions posit that humanity has important work to perform in 
 
 72.  For a detailed consideration of what justifications for each of these would look 
like, see Rosen, Two Ways, supra note 69, at 123–30. 
 73.  I am not suggesting that religious argumentation is inappropriate, for I am 
largely sympathetic with Waldron’s critique of public reason (pp. 210-213). While I agree 
that religious people should be able to give “the fullest and most honest account they 
can” (p. 213), it is troubling that a religious argument is the only support Waldron can 
muster for so central a plank of his thesis. This may not be troubling to Waldron. See p. 
179 (noting that “we have to ask how much of our account of human dignity, human 
worth, and basic human equality is bound up with religious ideas, and how much of it 
would have to be purged” without religious ideas). 
 74.  Waldron rightly observes that “the principle of basic equality has mainly 
secular work to do. It does its work in the world, here on earth among us” (p. 182). 
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working out the requirements of such weighty matters as what 
morality and natural law require.75 
2. Unduly Agency-Denying 
The ceding of agency that Waldron here embraces—the 
greater “passiv[ity]” (p. 188) as regards basic equality’s 
normative work—sits uneasily with his argumentative 
methodology for justifying basic equality, which aims to “make 
sense” of it by relying heavily on the reader’s intuitions and 
sensibilities. If intuitions were valid as regards basic equality’s 
justifications, why not its normative work as well? Waldron’s call 
for greater passivity in determining basic equality’s normative 
entailments thus seems to be in deep tension with the bulk of 
One Another’s Equals’ methodology. 
Finally, as was true of his Second Absolutist Claim, 
Waldron does not consistently stick to the Third Absolutist 
Claim either. In defending the position that basic equality fully 
applies to babies, Waldron advances what he calls a “trajectory 
view of a human life,” which makes basic equality fully 
applicable to all stages of a person’s life (pp. 234-235). Waldron 
recognizes that this has implications for abortion. Yet although 
he takes the position that the fetal stage is part of this full 
trajectory, Waldron concludes “[i]t does not follow that there 
should be laws prohibiting abortion” because “abortion policy is 
about what the law should or should not do so far as interfering 
with the reproductive lives of women is concerned” (p. 235). 
Waldron thus concedes that a fetus is entitled to basic 
equality, but thinks the law can allow its “early stage of a human 
life” to be ended at the largely unchecked insistence of another 
person. If so, basic equality’s normative work does not seem to 
amount to that much. And why, according to Waldron, can a 
fetus’ early stage life be ended? On account of the “reproductive 
lives of women” (p. 235). Far from treating the normative 
entailments of the fetus’ basic equality as a nonnegotiable 
absolute, Waldron allows it to be overridden.76 Once again, 
 
 75.  And Waldron recognizes this many times in the book (pp. 190–91, 193, 197). 
 76.  That competing principle concerning women’s reproductive lives might be 
conceptualized as an autonomy principle, or possibly as an aspect of basic equality. 
Either way, Waldron’s allowance for abortion would appear to permit compromise of the 
normative entailments of the fetus’ basic equality. 
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Waldron blinks when staring down absolutism’s concrete 
implications.77 He exercises active agency when setting out basic 
equality’s concrete policy implications for abortion. 
The Third Absolutist Claim has critical implications for 
constitutional doctrine. An unwavering insistence on the Third 
Absolutist Claim would radically destabilize abortion 
jurisprudence, as it would seem to call for a widespread if not 
universal prohibition of abortion to protect the fetus’ basic 
equality. More generally, insofar as constitutional doctrine 
almost always permits constitutional rights to be infringed to 
achieve sufficiently important countervailing interests in 
sufficiently narrow ways,78 the Third Absolutist Claim is in 
severe tension with large swaths of constitutional jurisprudence. 
More precisely, the Third Absolutist Claim would appear to 
destabilize the jurisprudence of any and all constitutional rights 
that are grounded in basic equality—which, according to 
Waldron, includes free speech, personal liberty, and freedom of 
religion (p. 249). 
3. Normatively Suspect 
Though Waldron blinks when considering the Third 
Absolutist Claim’s implications for abortion, he does not always 
blink. For example, he is steadfastly absolute as regards a 
captured terrorist who has information that might save the lives 
of innocents. Waldron insists the terrorist cannot be tortured to 
extract that information, even if torture is the only method of 
procuring information that would save innocent peoples’ lives 
(pp. 186-187). 
But why can the normative entailments of the fetus’ basic 
equality be traded off to achieve a countervailing interest while 
the terrorist’s basic equality cannot? Waldron does not tell us, so 
we are left to our own speculations. I can think of only two. First, 
perhaps the fetus’s normative entailments are subject to some 
sliding scale on account of its early stage in life or its being 
physically located within its mother. If so, Waldron has deviated 
 
 77.  Basic equality’s entailments vis-à-vis the PD was the other. See supra Section 
III. 
 78.  See generally Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? 
McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 
1537–40 (2015) [hererinafter Rosen, Non-Absolute]. 
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once again from the Second Absolutist Claim, insofar as he does 
not treat basic equality’s entailments as one-size-fits-all, but 
instead tailors them across subpopulations on the basis of their 
special properties. But if tailoring is appropriate on account of 
location on life’s temporal trajectory, why not also for a terrorist 
whose moral reasoning is out-of-range? 
Second, perhaps the normative entailments of the fetus’ 
basic equality can be compromised because nonnegotiability 
would impinge on a countervailing principle—women’s 
autonomy, or perhaps their basic equality insofar as they could 
not control their reproductive lives. But couldn’t it similarly be 
said that nonnegotiability of the normative entailments of the 
terrorist’s basic equality may impinge on the autonomy interests 
or basic equality of the innocents who will be killed if the attack 
is not averted?79 
Because Waldron blinks as regards abortion, we are entitled 
to ask why he does not blink when he considers the terrorist. His 
treatment of abortion means he is not entitled to answer by 
simply stating that basic equality’s prescriptive and normative 
entailments are absolute and nonnegotiable. But even if 
Waldron did not blink in relation to abortion—if he changed his 
position so that he could say “I treat basic equality’s entailments 
as nonnegotiable absolutes in all circumstances”—we should ask 
whether this is normatively appropriate. 
As to that, two things should be said. First, as explained 
above, One Another’s Equals does not provide much of an 
affirmative argument on behalf of the Third Absolutist Claim; all 
we get is a questionable phenomenological assertion joined with 
a largely unargued religious claim. Second, there seems to be 
strong reasons to doubt that the Third Absolutist Claim is 
normatively justifiable. While fully defending this position is a 
task beyond this Review’s scope, Waldron’s blinks provide 
insights into why absolutism is problematic. As suggested by his 
discussion of abortion, the normative universe we humans 
inhabit seems to be composed of multiple commitments that 
sometimes can conflict; conflict is possible because the 
multiplicity cannot be reduced to one, and because the 
 
 79.  More precisely, the permissibility of torture would be dependent on the 
empirical question of torture’s relative efficacy vis-à-vis other methods of obtaining the 
life-saving information. I do not claim to know the answer to that question. 
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multiplicity does not always peacefully coexist.80 And these 
multiple commitments cannot be neatly parceled into a 
predetermined hierarchy that satisfactorily decides which 
principle should trump in the event of conflict, on account of the 
fact-sensitivity of each commitment’s normative force and the 
limits of human foresight.81 Sorting out what is to be done with 
our multiple, potentially conflicting commitments is inescapably 
context-sensitive, and requires judgment. Recognizing that 
agency would seem to be a prerequisite to exercising our 
judgment as well as we humanly can. These reasons together 
explain why ceding our agency by latching onto an absolute 
prescription should be highly suspect. 
To put it bluntly, Waldron’s blinks suggest an unwillingness 
on his part to relinquish agency. Why should his readers do 
otherwise? 
IV. CLOSING—THOUGH NOT CONCLUDING—
THOUGHTS 
To help get a handle on this abstract talk about 
commitments’ fact-sensitivity, multiplicity, and amenability to 
conflict, consider basic equality’s implications for some difficult 
life-ending issues. Does basic equality dictate a single normative 
position toward the Jainist practice of Sallekhana, in which very 
old or very ill people stop eating, so as to die?82 As to whether 
the terminally ill or very old have a right-to-die? Does accepting 
basic equality determine the medical resources that should be 
devoted to the aged or to the terminally ill? Or what resources 
should be directed to babies who enter the world profoundly 
disabled? 
Now consider some more general methodological questions: 
Are basic equality’s concrete demands absolutely invariable 
across all the subpopulations identified above? Does basic 
equality trump all possible competing commitments? Are these 
 
 80.  See Rosen, Non-Absolute, supra note 78, at 1543–60. 
 81.  Waldron’s blink as regards the normative implications regarding the PD 
illustrates the context-sensitivity of normative commitments. See Rosen, Non-Absolute, 
supra note 78, at 1582–83 (2015) (discussing the context-sensitivity of normative 
commitments); John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 MONIST 331 (1979) (defending the 
view that morally correct outcomes are fact-sensitive). 
 82.  See Justic T.K. Tukol, Sallekhana, https://www.jainworld.com/education/
seniors/senles15.htm (last visited July 7, 2018). 
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questions best answered by adopting a “passive” approach? 
What would that even mean? 
I am not certain how any of the first set of life-ending 
questions should be answered. But as regards the 
methodological questions, I have considerably more confidence. 
It seems hard to believe that basic equality’s concrete 
implications should be invariable across all those scenarios, or 
that basic equality trumps all conceivable competing interests. 
For these reasons, actively acknowledging our necessary agency 
in answering these questions seems to be a superior mindset than 
passivity. 
As regards the exercise of our agency in addressing these 
types of difficult questions, Waldron’s book is invaluable. Its 
deep and careful prodding of basic equality’s justificatory 
grounds better enables us to work out basic equality’s proper 
normative entailments. For example, Waldron’s argument that 
basic equality’s dignitary entailments are partly owing to the 
human capacities for moral reasoning and counter-causal 
freedom seems highly germane to the question of whether 
people on the threshold of Alzheimer’s Disease should have a 
right to assisted suicide, which in turn may implicate 
constitutional autonomy issues.83 In short, the Review’s 
arguments against Waldron’s absolutist claims, and the Review’s 
insistence that One Another’s Equals not be understood as 
providing definitive prescriptive and normative answers, is not 
tantamount to saying that the book leaves us where we were 
before. Clarifying the principles that undergird basic equality is 
necessary to allow for equality’s intelligent application and 
further development.84 
 
 83.  The Supreme Court confronted the question of whether there is a 
constitutionally protected right-to-die, but declined to provide a general answer to it, in 
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). 
 84.  It is to be hoped that acknowledging the need for our ongoing agency does not 
invite the sort of purely self-regarding behaviors that are characteristic of ordinary 
politics. Decisions concerning our foundational societal commitments, like equality, 
appropriately make different demands than do the decisions that belong to the domain of 
ordinary politics. See generally Mark D. Rosen, The Special Norms Thesis, 40 CARDOZO 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). And as regards the heightened demands that ought to apply 
to decisionmaking concerning a society’s foundational commitments, the many insights 
afforded by One Another’s Equals’ careful and thoughtful analysis are both appropriate 
and necessary. 
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To be sure, even the responsible exercise of our agency may 
not yield objectively verifiable results, on account of the nature 
of the domain of knowledge to which these normative questions 
belong.85 If so, an informed societal consensus that arises after 
active consideration may be the only, and best, outcome for 
which we can hope.86 Although I concededly have not provided 
comprehensive arguments for this proposition, or for the last 
paragraph’s affirmative claims, I hope that this Review has 
shown that One Another’s Equals has not provided sufficient 
arguments to establish its alternative absolutist theses. 
To conclude, Waldron’s illuminating investigation of basic 
equality immeasurably advances our preparedness for 
continuing the agency-demanding task of working out the 
entailments of our communal commitment to basic equality. 
Basic equality may not be a Jeffersonian axiomatic truth, though 
perhaps it had to be treated as such when our political culture 
first embraced it. But thanks to Waldron, basic equality is no 
longer a Morganian unexamined fiction. Waldron’s careful 
analysis should not trigger Morganian anxiety—to the contrary, I 
am confident our political culture can be the better for it. But 
the book’s benefits are best realized if we recognize that working 
out the entailments of our collective commitment to equality 
requires self-conscious agency, not absolutism-induced passivity. 
 
 85.  For an illuminating discussion of the different domains of knowledge, and the 
claim that each has distinctive methods and criteria for establishing truth claims, see 
SCANLON, supra note 18, at 19–20. 
 86.  This may be particularly true in relation to challenges that all of us are equally 
(more or less) likely to face at some point in our lives. 
